Epidemics are among the greatest threats to humanity, and the International
learned and are now merely restating old lessons. This suggests that to achieve real change, we need to take lessons one step further and ask about the implementation of the lessons themselves; about the political barriers to action and the strategies needed to overcome them. The emerging threat of the Zika virus underscores that we have no time to waste.
11
The objective of this Article is twofold. First, we seek to compare the lessons from H1N1 and Ebola head on, in order to test the hypothesis that the lessons are similar and to examine the most important similarities and differences. Second, we seek to examine the barriers to implementing these lessons and to identify strategies for overcoming the barriers and effectively implementing IHR reform proposals. Parts II and III introduce the IHR and the H1N1 and Ebola outbreaks, respectively. Part IV analyzes the operation of the IHR during those outbreaks and the lessons learned from each. Part V examines the barriers to implementing lessons learned, and the final section concludes with strategies to overcome them.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS
A. HISTORY
The current IHR has a long pedigree. Travel and trade measures to stop the spread of infectious diseases were imposed as early as in the fourteenth century. 12 At that time, the city of Dubrovnik (then known as Ragusa) required ships coming from infected, or suspected to be infected, sites to stay at anchor for thirty days before docking. 13 The isolation period for land travellers was 40 days, corresponding to the term "quarantine."
14
More coordinated efforts to stem the international spread of disease began in the mid-1800s, chiefly in the form of international sanitary conferences, with the first one taking place in Paris in 1851. 15 These conferences were held mainly out of fear that diseases from Asia and the Middle East would spread to Europe and North America. 16 Over the next 100 years, several international sanitary conventions were adopted and became part of international law. 17 International institutions were also established, including the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau (1902) (1999) . 18 Hoffman, supra note 15, at 512.
been called the "classical regime" governing global disease outbreaks. 19 This regime had two basic components: (1) obligations on state parties to "notify each other about outbreaks of specified infectious diseases in their territories"; and (2) obligations to "limit disease-prevention measures that restricted international travel and trade to those based on scientific evidence and public health principles."
20
After the establishment of the World Health Organization ("WHO") in 1948, it took only three years before its plenary governing body-the World Health Assembly-adopted the International Sanitary Regulations ("ISR"). 21 The ISR were established under the authority of Articles 21 and 22 of the WHO constitution, which allowed the WHO to make regulations on "sanitary and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread of disease." 22 The 1951 ISR brought together the pre-existing twelve conventions and related agreements into one binding legal framework overseen by the WHO. 23 In 1969, the ISR changed its name to the International Health Regulations 24 and was narrowed in scope from six to four diseases; a scope that was further narrowed in 1981 to only include cholera, plague, and yellow fever. 25 In the period from 1951 to the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome ("SARS") in 2002, the classical regime became "marginalized" and limitations of the ISR/IHR became increasingly evident. 26 One obvious shortcoming was the exclusive emphasis on three diseases. 27 Another was the lack of accountability and enforcement mechanisms to promote states' compliance with the Regulations. 28 It was also a problem that the IHR only allowed the WHO to act on epidemiological evidence provided by its member states rather than independent scientists, research centers, civil society organizations, or news media. 29 Ever increasing appreciation of these limitations led the World Health Assembly to formally initiate an IHR revision process in 1995. 30 This decision was motivated by the 1994 plague outbreak in India; the 1995 Ebola outbreak in what was formerly Zaire; and, more fundamentally, an increasing sensitivity to the transnational risks arising from the greater interconnectedness of globalization and to the link between infectious diseases and national security. 31 Even so, the IHR revision process moved slowly for a long time. It had lasted seven years when an unusual form of respiratory illness started to emerge in the Guangdong Province of China in November, 2002. 32 This was the beginning of the SARS outbreak; an outbreak widely seen as the trigger of the final push towards the 19 Fidler, supra note 16, at 327-28 (defining the "classical regime" as a period between 1851 and 1951). 20 Id. at 328. 21 DAVIES, KAMRADT-SCOTT, AND RUSHTON, supra note 15, at 5. 22 Barbara von Tigerstrom, The Revised International Health Regulations and Restraint of National Health Measures, 13 HEALTH L. J. 35, 36 (2005) . 23 Fidler, supra note 16, at 328-29. 24 Id. at 333. 25 DAVIES, KAMRADT-SCOTT, AND RUSHTON, supra note 15, at 5. 26 Id. at 21; Fidler, supra note 16, at 333. 27 von Tigerstrom, supra note 22, at 36 (limiting the focus to plague, cholera, and yellow fever). 28 Id. at 37; Hoffman, supra note 15, at 514. 29 33 The SARS outbreak demonstrated to the world the many shortcomings of the old IHR. 34 In particular, SARS was not caused by any of the three pathogens covered by the IHR, 35 and it took months before the full scale of the outbreak was acknowledged because the Chinese government initially refused to cooperate with the WHO.
36
The new IHR were eventually adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2005. Five key shortcomings of the 1969 IHR had then been addressed. First, the scope of the IHR had been expanded from the three pathogens to cover the broader terms of "event," "public health risk," and "public health emergency of international concern" ("PHEIC").
37 Second, the new IHR came with obligations on state parties to develop minimum core public health capacities. 38 Third, the new IHR allowed the WHO to access and use information from non-governmental sources. 39 Fourth, the WHO Director-General was authorized to declare PHEICs and to issue recommendations on how state parties are to address such emergencies. 40 And finally, the new IHR explicitly required States to respect human rights in their implementation of the Regulations.
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The IHR entered into force on June 15, 2007, for the 191 states that had not made reservations to them. As of February 2016, there were 196 state parties to the IHR, including all WHO member states.
42

B. STRUCTURE AND CONTENT
The purpose of the IHR is to "prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade."
43 Simply put, the aim is to maximize protection against public health risks while minimizing interference with travel and trade. The components of the IHR can be categorized in several ways. 44 What follows is a simple categorization that is roughly aligned with the chain of events in the case of a PHEIC.
National Public Health Capacities
The IHR require state parties to develop, strengthen, and maintain two types of national public health capacities. One is core capacities to detect, notify, and report events. 45 The other is core capacities to respond promptly and effectively to public 33 Although the IHR entered into force in 2007, state parties did not have to meet the public health capacity requirements until 2012. 50 The parties could also request two extensions of two years. 51 While the IHR urge state parties to collaborate and provide technical and financial support, 52 they do not specify any enforceable obligations to do so or provide for any pooled financing mechanism to facilitate this kind of support.
Notification and Sharing of Information
The IHR require state parties to notify the WHO of all events that may constitute a PHEIC within its territory. 53 A PHEIC is defined as an extraordinary event that is determined to both constitute a "public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease," and "to potentially require a coordinated international response."
54 An "event," more generally, is defined as a "manifestation of disease or an occurrence that creates a potential for disease."
55
The IHR provide state parties with a decision instrument for assessing whether an event may constitute a PHEIC. 56 Central to this instrument are four questions: (1) is the public health impact of the event serious?; (2) is the event unusual or unexpected?; (3) is there a significant risk of international spread?; and (4) is there a significant risk of international travel and trade restrictions? If a state party identifies an event that may constitute a PHEIC, the State must notify the WHO within twenty-four hours. 57 Moreover, if a state party has evidence of such an event, it is required to provide the WHO with "all relevant public health information."
58
State parties are also obligated to respond to requests from the WHO seeking to verify the existence of an event that may constitute a PHEIC. 59 Beyond these obligations, the IHR provide an explicit option for consultations between a state party and the WHO in the case of events occurring within its territory that do not require notification. 60 46 Id., at art. 13. 47 61 The WHO is supposed to primarily act in collaboration with state parties in whose territory the event is occurring.
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A new feature of the 2005 IHR is that the WHO may consider information from sources other than state notifications or consultations. 63 This means that the WHO can access and use information from non-governmental sources, including health workers, civil society organizations, and news media. In these cases, the IHR requires that the WHO request verification from the state party in whose territory the event is allegedly occurring. 64 The WHO cannot act on any non-governmental information before it has tried to obtain such verification.
The IHR also authorize the WHO Director-General to declare a PHEIC. 65 Before doing so, the Director-General must consult with the state party in whose territory the event arises 66 and obtain the advice of an Emergency Committee, 67 which is a temporary committee of experts established by the Director-General.
For situations in which a PHEIC has been declared, the IHR give the WHO's Director-General the power to issue temporary recommendations.
68
These recommendations may include health measures to be implemented by the state party in whose territory the event is occurring, or by other parties. 69 An equally important class of recommendations includes those advising against specific health measures. 
Permissible Health Measures
The IHR impose a range of limitations on the health measures state parties can implement. 71 These constraints are primarily motivated by concerns for travel, trade, and human rights. With regard to travelers, state parties cannot generally require invasive medical examination, vaccination, or other prophylaxis as a condition of entry, 72 and state parties are required to respect travelers' dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. 73 In addition, the IHR require that any health measures be applied in a "transparent and non-discriminatory manner."
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The IHR also impose restrictions on the "additional health measures" state parties can pursue. 75 For these measures to be permitted, they must meet a number of conditions specified in Article 43. In particular, the additional measures are not to be more restrictive of international traffic nor more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of health protection. The IHR require state parties to base their determination of whether to implement additional health measures upon scientific principles, available evidence and information, and specific guidance or advice from the WHO. 76 A state party implementing an additional measure that significantly interferes with international traffic is required to inform the WHO within forty-eight hours of implementation about this measure and its health rationale, unless covered by a temporary or standing recommendation. 77 The WHO may then request that the state party concerned reconsider the application of the measure, 78 The virus continued to spread within Mexico, the United States, and beyond. On June 11, 2009, Dr. Chan declared that an influenza pandemic was underway. 88 Over the next year, more than 214 countries and territories reported laboratory-confirmed cases of H1N1. 89 Finally, on August 10, 2010, Dr. Chan announced that the world was moving into H1N1's post-pandemic period. 90 Estimates of total H1N1 cases globally range from several tens of millions to 200 million. 91 While there were around 18,500 laboratory-confirmed deaths worldwide, modeling has suggested overall mortality of more than fifteen times that figure. 
B. THE 2014 EBOLA EPIDEMIC
The 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa began with a toddler in the remote village of Meliandou in Guinea. 93 The boy developed a fever on December 26, 2013, and died a few days later. 94 For nearly three months, the virus spread as a mysterious disease. 95 While local health officials at first suspected cholera, microscopic examination of patient samples concluded that the unknown disease was different.
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Further investigations were conducted by the Guinean Ministry of Health, Médecins Sans Frontières ("MSF"), and the WHO.
97 Eventually, the diagnosis of Ebola was confirmed by the Institut Pasteur in France on March 22, 2014. 98 The Guinean government notified the WHO the same day, and the WHO publicly announced the outbreak the day after.
99
In the following months, the virus spread throughout Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone-the three countries that would become most affected. 100 In this period, there were numerous warnings from early responders. MSF stated in late March that the outbreak was "unprecedented" with a spread "never before seen. 96 See id. 97 Id. 98 Id. The Institut confirmed that the causative agent was a filovirus on March 21st, which narrowed the diagnosis to either Ebola or Marburg hemorrhagic fever, but it was not until the next day that the lab was able to confirm it was indeed Ebola. 99 Id. 100 Id. director of operations called the epidemic "out of control." 102 In July, Ebola spread to neighboring Nigeria, resulting in nineteen confirmed cases. 103 And in early August, a medical missionary who contracted Ebola while working in Liberia was transported back to the United States for treatment. 104 He became the first Ebola patient treated outside Africa. 105 This was the backdrop when the WHO's Director-General declared a PHEIC on August 8, 2014.
106 At that time, Ebola had already claimed at least 932 lives. 107 Following the declaration, the virus continued to spread in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, with some new cases also appearing in Italy, Mali, Senegal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 108 The national and international response gained momentum in the fall of 2014, 109 and the number of new cases per week increased until October 2014. 110 Since then, transmission has slowly decreased, until West Africa was declared free of Ebola transmission on January 14, 2016. 111 The high risk for flare-ups was also acknowledged, and a new case was confirmed in Sierra Leone just hours after the declaration. 112 Up to that date, more than 11,300 deaths from Ebola had been recorded. 119 Many of the recommendations proposed by the various lesson-learned exercises do not require a renegotiation and revision of the IHR provisions. However, these recommendations are usefully seen as one kind of IHR-reform proposal, as they are critical to the effectuation of the IHR.
A. COUNTRIES' PUBLIC HEALTH CAPACITIES
The IHR require that state parties achieve core capacities to detect, assess, notify, and report events and to respond to public health risks and PHEICs. 120 The deadline for achieving these capacities was set to five years from when the Regulations became effective, or June 2012. 121 However, when the WHO conducted a survey prior to this deadline, only sixty-six percent of 194 state parties responded, 122 and only ten percent of reporting states indicated that they had fully implemented the IHR core capacities.
123 H1N1 made these dire statistics clear to the world. While Mexican authorities reacted swiftly to the outbreak, limited surveillance capacities delayed identification of the outbreak in Mexico. 124 Similarly, the low number of cases and fatalities reported by many African countries during the H1N1 pandemic has been attributed to a lack of technical capacity rather than actual lack of cases. 125 Also, outside Africa, many countries were overwhelmed by the WHO's data requests due to limited laboratory capacities.
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One of the key recommendations after H1N1, therefore, was to strengthen the core public health capacities required by the IHR.
127 Some proposals focused on new mechanisms for helping countries to monitor their core capacities, on updating the guidelines for national focal points, and on examples of IHR "good practices."
128 It was noted that detailed guidelines for assessment, planning, and capacity building 117 COMM'N ON A GLOBAL HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK , supra note 5, at 2. 118 were absent until the spring of 2010. 129 Others called for stronger external support for capacity building, recommending that mechanisms be developed to facilitate richer countries' support for poorer countries.
130 There were also proposals for changing the way development assistance is administered 131 and for linking external support to countries' demonstrated improvements in public health capacities.
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The lessons from H1N1 were generally not acted upon.
133 Dr. Chan blamed this inaction on the global financial crisis and a lack of resources.
134 Whatever was to blame, very few countries had reached full implementation of the IHR by 2013, just prior to the outbreak of Ebola.
135 Also, for each of the specific public health capacities, only a limited number of countries had fulfilled IHR requirements, and many countries had not even reported their status. 136 Among those countries that failed to fully achieve the IHR-related capacities was Sierra Leone, and among those that failed to report any data in 2013 were Guinea and Liberia. Broadly strengthening public health capacities and health systems was persistently recommended in the wake of Ebola. 141 The proposals for these changes were similar to those following H1N1, pertaining primarily to the assessment of core capacities and external support for their strengthening. Many have argued for supplementing country reporting with independent and more transparent assessments. 142 Many have also stressed the need to develop mechanisms that can facilitate richer countries' support of capacity building in poorer countries. 143 This might be done through a donor conference, 144 through devising a prioritized and costed plan involving multiple stakeholders, 145 or through the establishment of an international fund. 146 Cutting across these suggestions, an accountability commission for disease outbreak and response has been proposed to monitor both investments and results in core capacity building. 147 Another proposal was to make external support for health system strengthening conditional upon a country's participation in an external assessment process. 148 Further, like after the H1N1 pandemic, some suggested that the IHR should be revised to include more concrete steps for building health systems capacities (see Table 1 ). 149 
B. NOTIFICATION AND INFORMATION SHARING
The IHR require state parties to notify the WHO of all events that may constitute a PHEIC within its territory. 150 State parties are also required to respond to WHO requests to verify the existence of an event that may constitute a PHEIC, 151 and the IHR encourages sharing of information more generally.
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The Mexican government is widely believed to have performed well during the H1N1 pandemic with regard to notification and information sharing-that is, once H1N1 was identified and its diagnosis was confirmed. 153 While it took more time than needed before the Mexican authorities notified PAHO and the WHO, this has mostly been attributed to limitations in surveillance capacities rather than lack of will or intention. 154 When the Mexican National IHR Focal Point received a verification request from PAHO on April 11, 2009, he confirmed the existence of acute respiratory infections within twenty-four hours, assessed the outbreak to be a potential PHEIC, and notified PAHO accordingly. 155 Mexico also shared information with Canada and the United States, in line with their tri-national public health collaboration agreements and as encouraged under the IHR. 156 While Mexico may be lauded for their reporting and notification, this was not the case for all other countries during the H1N1 pandemic. Following the pandemic, several commentators stressed the importance of greater information sharing among countries, 157 as well as better communication between national authorities and the WHO. 158 Commentators agreed that national authorities often had strong incentives to not report and notify about emerging threats. 159 It was suggested that notifying countries could get privileged access to benefits and compensation. 160 A more indirect strategy proposed was to strengthen compliance among non-affected countries. 161 As further discussed below, the link between obligations to notify and obligations to refrain from undue restrictions on travel and trade is at the heart of the IHR, and better compliance among non-affected countries would reduce disincentives for affected countries to notify. 162 Among the other proposals following H1N1 were to increase knowledge about the IHR among decision makers 163 and to clarify the decision instrument for helping determine whether an event constitutes a PHEIC. 164 In the case of Ebola, there were significant delays in notification and information sharing from the outset. It took the Guinean authorities more than two months from when the first person developed Ebola symptoms to when they notified the WHO on March 13, 2014. 165 It seems to be a widely held view that the situation in Guinea was known to represent an event that "may constitute" a PHEIC long before that date. It has also been noted that while the Guinean authorities were aware of a large number of deaths from an unknown disease near and across the border with Sierra Leone, they failed to convey this information to the authorities there. 166 Beyond these shortcomings in the early phase, the Guinean authorities-alongside their Sierra Leonean and Liberian counterparts-have been repeatedly accused of trying to downplay the true severity of the outbreak. 167 The Guinean government allegedly focused on positive communication to avoid scaring away airlines and mining companies. 168 Similarly, MSF has reported that the Guinean and Sierra Leonean governments actively worked against the humanitarian organization in sounding the alarm. 169 In Sierra Leone, for example, the government instructed only laboratory-confirmed deaths to be reported, and the Ministry of Health refused to share data, such as lists of contacts, with MSF. 170 Many reasons have been suggested for the unwillingness to share information. Most pertain to the expected decrease in travel and trade and the accompanying economic and political repercussions. 171 The WHO apparently feared that declaring a PHEIC could hurt West Africa's economy and unnecessarily interfere with the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. 172 History had indeed provided reasons to worry. The most affected countries and areas in both the SARS and the H1N1 outbreaks experienced significant economic burdens because of unnecessary travel and trade restrictions unilaterally imposed by other countries.
173
Following the Ebola outbreak, many commentators have therefore stressed the need to reduce disincentives for notifying public health risks to the WHO and for information sharing more generally. 174 175 This may encourage countries to report events on a regular basis and make reporting less extraordinary. Another strategy is to make budgetary support available for governments making alerts, or to promise compensation for economic losses resulting from notification, possibly through a new insurance scheme.
176 A third strategy is to publish lists of countries that delay reporting, while commending countries that rapidly share information. 177 Finally, a fourth strategy is to strengthen compliance among non-affected countries.
178 Beyond these incentive-based strategies, it has been recommended that the WHO take a more active role in coordinating information sharing among countries. 179 Promoting general knowledge about the IHR and revising the IHR decision instrument to reduce state parties' discretion in reporting events has also been recommended. 177 Moon et al., supra note 10, at 6; see also COMM'N ON A GLOBAL HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK, supra note 5, at 6, 57 (recommending establishing "protocols for avoiding suppression or delays in data and alerts"). 178 See COMM'N ON A GLOBAL HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK, supra note 5, at 57 (recommending that a new mechanism should hold governments accountable for performance during a global health risk); WHO, REPORT OF THE EBOLA INTERIM ASSESSMENT PANEL, supra note 10, at 11-12 ("[M]ore than 40 countries implemented additional measures that significantly interfered with international traffic," which increased the burden on affected countries); Moon et al., supra note 10, at 6-7 (suggesting that "alternate governance mechanisms are needed to prevent isolating countries when outbreaks strike").
179 COMM'N ON A GLOBAL HEALTH RISK FRAMEWORK, supra note 5, at 53-54. 180 See Gostin, DeBartolo & Friedman, supra note 10, at 3 ("The World Health Assembly could amend the decision instrument to reduce States Parties' reporting discretion, avoiding delayed notification or verification."); Kamradt-Scott, supra note 133, at 12-13 (concluding that intergovernmental organizations are "ultimately the creations of governments" that are subject to poor political leadership with respect to international health regulation). 181 relationship between the IHR and WHO's pandemic alert system. 186 Another much debated topic during and after the H1N1 pandemic was the anonymity of the members of the Emergency Committee that advised the declaration of a PHEIC. 187 This fueled distrust and suspicion about links between committee members and the pharmaceutical industry, which stood to gain from declaration of a PHEIC and the resulting increase in drug sales it would cause. 188 The H1N1 pandemic was therefore followed by a call for greater transparency about the Emergency Committee, and the WHO has disclosed members' names for all subsequent Emergency and Review Committees.
189 Following H1N1, it was also recommended that the WHO better align the IHR with other disaster management and emergency response frameworks, 190 and that it enhance cooperation with actors in sectors other than health. 191 Finally, it was recommended that member states ensure more stable funding for the WHO 192 and set up a contingency fund.
193
However, the Ebola outbreak proved more challenging for the WHO and its responsibilities as defined by the IHR. It took nearly three months from the time that the first patient developed symptoms until the diagnosis of Ebola was confirmed.
194 It has been suggested that the length of this period highlights the WHO's inadequate arrangements for validating and responding to information on outbreaks in resourcepoor settings. 195 It took an additional four months before the Director-General declared the Ebola outbreak to be a PHEIC on August 8, 2014. 196 The WHO has been heavily 186 criticized for waiting this long. 197 The WHO Ebola Interim Assessment Panel-a committee of independent experts tasked with reviewing the WHO's response to the Ebola outbreak-has judged the delays in declaring a PHEIC to be "significant and unjustifiable."
198 Dr. Chan herself acknowledged that at least some delays were unnecessary. 199 Suggested reasons for delays include the WHO's organizational culture, problems with information flow, regional decision-making structures within the WHO, and difficulties in negotiating with affected countries. 200 Irrespective of the reasons, numerous early warnings from MSF and others did not reach senior WHO leaders, or senior WHO leaders did not recognize their significance. 201 Around the time of the declaration of a PHEIC, the international response gained traction. 202 Yet, the WHO has been criticized for a slow and inadequate response in this phase of the outbreak as well. 203 Against this background, many have now called for WHO reforms. 204 For example, it has been recommended that the WHO improve its surveillance based on non-governmental sources, 205 further increase transparency of the work of its Emergency Committees, 206 create a standing Emergency Committee instead of temporary ad-hoc committees specific to each outbreak, 207 introduce an intermediate event category between a PHEIC and no PHEIC, 208 create a clearer mechanism for coordination and escalation in health crises, 209 enhance the means of cooperation with non-state actors, 210 and better integrate the IHR framework with other emergency response and humanitarian frameworks. 211 It has also been recommended that the WHO establish a Center for Emergency Preparedness and Response, 212 as well as a contingency fund to support emergency response. 213 Many more general reform proposals have also been put forward, 214 including proposals for increased and sustained funding of WHO's core functions 215 and for member states to relinquish more of their control of WHO. 216 Many of these recommendations are reminiscent of those following the H1N1 pandemic.
While most or all of the reform proposals appear reasonable, it is worth mentioning that some of the criticism of the WHO lack nuance. The WHO took action also before it declared a PHEIC, for example, by sending 113 technical experts to West Africa by April 2014. 217 The outbreak was novel, and many experts outside the WHO also misjudged the situation. 218 Evidence available in mid-May seemed to suggest that the epidemic was already coming under control and petering out. 219 The affected countries did not cooperate optimally, 220 and the WHO was dealing with several other challenges at the time the Ebola outbreak escalated, including humanitarian crises in the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Syria, and the spread of the MERS and H7N9 viruses. 221 Moreover, even the legitimate blame attributed to the WHO overall cannot fully be directed to its secretariat: it is the member states that refused to give up more control and refused to increase the WHO's assessed budgetary contributions, while approving budget cuts for emergency response. 222 In fact, only three years after the H1N1 pandemic, the budget for "Outbreak and Emergency Response" was cut by thirty-five percent. 223 
D. PERMISSIBLE HEALTH MEASURES
According to the IHR, state parties are not to implement measures that unnecessarily restrict travel, trade, or human rights. 224 Two days after declaring the H1N1 outbreak a PHEIC on April 25, 2009, 225 Dr. Chan stressed that all measures should conform to the purpose and scope of the IHR. 226 More specifically, Dr. Chan recommended "not to close borders and not to restrict international travel," 227 a temporary recommendation that remained unchanged until the pandemic was declared over in August 2010. 228 Despite this plea, many state parties did impose travel and trade restrictions that seemed to contravene the IHR. 229 According to one estimate, fifteen percent of state parties did so. 230 Some countries, including Argentina, China, Cuba, and Peru, suspended flights to and from Mexico. 231 Other countries went further and banned any person arriving directly from Mexico from entering their territory. 232 Some countries quarantined travelers coming from Mexico, Canada, and the United States, and some quarantined Mexican, Canadian, and American nationals irrespective of their potential exposure to the H1N1 influenza virus. 233 Many countries also imposed trade restrictions that contravened WHO recommendations. 234 In particular, several countries banned meat from Mexico, Canada, and the United States. 235 This happened despite the WHO's general recommendation against trade restrictions and repeated confirmations that the consumption of pork was safe. 236 For state parties that implemented additional measures during H1N1 that interfered with international traffic, the IHR required those States to proactively inform the WHO and to provide a rationale for their measures. 237 None of the parties implementing these measures did so, and not all parties bothered to provide a rationale upon the WHO's request.
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A prevailing recommendation after the H1N1 pandemic, therefore, was to strengthen compliance with the IHR's provisions on travel and trade restrictions. The post-H1N1 Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations stated that the most important structural shortcoming of the IHR is "the lack of enforceable sanction." 239 Many commentators suggested that the WHO could more energetically and proactively seek state parties' rationales for restrictive measures, assess the rationale provided, and, when appropriate, publicly ask parties to reconsider. 240 Additionally, it was proposed to increase transparency and to make readily available information about what measures countries were taking, whether the WHO has requested a rationale, whether the country in question has provided a rationale, and, in that case, information about the rationale. 241 Beyond this form of "naming and shaming," it was recommended that governments should exert more peer pressure 242 and that the WHO or others should strengthen the dispute resolution mechanisms associated with the IHR. 243 In the wake of the H1N1 pandemic, it was also suggested to build and strengthen enforcement mechanisms, through the World Trade Organization ("WTO") 244 or through the possibility of revoking States' privileges at the World Health Assembly. 245 These recommendations had not been implemented to any significant degree when the WHO declared the Ebola outbreak a PHEIC on August 8, 2014. 246 With that declaration, Dr. Chan stated that there should be "no general ban on international travel or trade," 247 and this recommendation was restated throughout 2014 and 2015. 248 Despite WHO's guidance, more than forty countries implemented additional measures that significantly interfered with international traffic-outside the scope of the temporary recommendations-over the course of the Ebola outbreak.
249 Multiple countries closed their borders and banned travelers coming from the most affected countries. Senegal, for example, closed its border with Guinea, issued a travel ban, and prohibited flights and ships from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. 250 Some countries, including Australia and Canada, suspended the processing of travel visas for persons from the most affected countries. 251 Few of these countries informed the WHO about the additional measures they were taking. Unsurprisingly, one of the most pervasive recommendations after the Ebola outbreak has been to strengthen compliance with the IHR's provisions on travel and trade restrictions-just as after H1N1. Specifically, it has been suggested that the WHO be empowered to more forcefully request justification of any additional measures. 253 It has also been recommended that WHO publicly name state parties that impose unnecessary restrictions, 254 and that the dispute resolution mechanisms associated with the IHR be strengthened. 255 It has also been argued that the IHR must be linked to effective enforcement mechanisms; for example, by involving the WTO or the UN Security Council. 256 This includes a proposal to establish a Global Health Committee of the UN Security Council that would be partly tasked with addressing alleged non-compliance with the IHR provisions on travel and trade. 257 Several of these proposals seek to exploit the WTO's particularly strong dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms 258 or the legally-binding nature of UN Security Council resolutions. 259 Finally, it has been proposed to revise the IHR to make temporary recommendations legally obligatory. 260 Non-compliance is a general and well-known challenge for international law. 261 Compliance with IHR provisions on travel and trade restrictions is also closely linked to compliance with its other provisions. The fear of travel and trade restrictions makes countries hesitate to notify and share information about public health risks. 262 And conversely, it has been argued that the behavior of the affected West African countries and the WHO gave non-affected states reasons to ignore their part of the deal, thus resulting in illegal restrictions on travel and trade. 263 
V. THE POLITICS OF INACTION
Perhaps the most tragic part of the recent Ebola epidemic is that much of the human suffering and costs could have been avoided had proposed changes to the WHO and the IHR been implemented after the H1N1 pandemic. Opportunities for strengthening global pandemic governance were known but never acted on. Among the few exceptions are the proposals for improving transparency about the members and decision-making process of the Emergency Committee. Many other post-H1N1 recommendations could also have been implemented rather quickly, but by the time Ebola broke out, little change and few processes promising change came about. As a result, lessons learned following the Ebola epidemic have overlapped significantly with the old lessons from the H1N1 pandemic that occurred five years earlier.
This raises at least two important questions. First, why were lessons from the H1N1 pandemic largely ignored? Second, what is needed to ensure Ebola's lessons result in meaningful changes to the IHR that will help us better prevent and respond to future epidemics?
Fortunately, to answer these questions, we are able to benefit from the work of political scientists who frequently study the processes through which topics become objects of discussion (i.e., agenda setting), 264 issues change in perceived importance (i.e., prioritization), 265 and policy options are considered and chosen for implementation (i.e., decision making). 266 In this case, IHR reform was clearly on the agenda after the H1N1 pandemic; the problem is that it was never perceived to be sufficiently important by key decision makers, such that no major reforms were considered or chosen for implementation. This means we can draw on political prioritization frameworks to help answer the two questions.
One such framework was developed by Jeremy Shiffman and Stephanie Smith specifically to analyze the determinants of political priority for global health initiatives and understand an issue's place on the global health agenda.
267 This framework focuses on four categories of determinants of political prioritization: (1) actor power (i.e., the strength of the individuals and organizations concerned with the issue); (2) ideas (i.e., the ways in which those involved with the issue understand and portray it); (3) political contexts (i.e., the environments in which actors operate); and (4) issue characteristics (i.e., the features of the problem). 268 Examining each determinant reveals much about why the IHR were not reformed after the H1N1 pandemic and what strategies can be used to overcome inaction in the future, as most barriers are still present (see Table 2 ). While the barriers apply at the global level, corresponding barriers are often also at work within countries. Evaluating the wide range of barriers to action concurrently and within a systematic framework makes it easier to devise strategies that are sensitive to the many determinants of political priority and strategies that target more than one determinant at a time. 264 See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1995) . 265 Lack of consensus among experts on which specific reform proposals were best, how they should be prioritized, and how they should be financed Lack of consensus among governments over the same issues f. External frame: degree to which public portrayals resonate with external audiences Risk unknown, remote, and distant, which makes it harder to attract public attention or concern "Health is global" and "interdependence" arguments have not fully resonated with the public and policy makers 
A. ACTOR POWER
The first category of determinants of global political priority for any particular issue is the strength of the individuals and organizations concerned with the issue. More specifically, this is about policy community cohesion (i.e., the degree of coalescence among the network of individuals and organizations central to issue), leadership (i.e., the individuals who are strong champions for the cause and capable of uniting the policy community), guiding institutions (i.e., the effectiveness of organizations or coordinating mechanisms) and civil society mobilization (i.e., the extent to which grassroots organizations have mobilized to press political authorities to address the issue).
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With respect to pandemics, there is no united policy community strongly advocating for preparedness. We have a fragmented potpourri of actors who are stretched across health and non-health sectors and have differing priorities and mandates. 271 Some actors focus on disease surveillance, others on a humanitarian response, and still others on clinical guidelines development-with limited interaction with one another. There is also limited involvement of actors outside the health sector, as many of these see IHR reform as a health issue that does not implicate them. 272 The Global Health Security Agenda, which was launched in February 2014, seeks to promote a more unified community, but it is still not a completed effort. 273 In particular, the cohesiveness of the community addressing pandemic preparedness remains far from that of the global community addressing HIV/AIDS, for example.
Following the H1N1 pandemic, leadership for reform was also lacking. 274 Few leaders stepped up to champion reforms despite many calls to do so. Leadership certainly did not come from WHO's Director-General or heads of member states, who would be essential in administering and negotiating any changes to the IHR, respectively. If anything did happen on this front, it was a more general WHO reform process, initiated in 2011, that attracted most of the attention. 275 Nor did leadership come from other actors, like the Director of the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which could have articulated and advocated for a compelling vision for IHR reform.
Alongside the lack of individual leadership, there was also a lack of effective institutions to guide reform efforts. The one natural guiding institution, the WHO, was ill-equipped post-H1N1 due to budget reductions and competing priorities shifting resources away from fighting infectious diseases. 276 At the same time, no other institution was truly focused on the IHR or issues under its purview. Likewise, few civil society organizations were devoted to advocating for pandemic preparation, and few demanded IHR reform following the pandemic. Instead, most civil society organizations in the health sector were and are focused on present disasters like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and childhood diseases. 277 To many activists, prioritizing pandemic preparedness may be like purchasing home insurance when there are many house fires already burning and in desperate need of dousing. This may mainly be a practical imperative, because it can be hard to mobilize supporters and donors to act against an unidentified threat for which the exact time, location, and severity cannot be known in advance. 278 But, even if civil society organizations had demanded IHR reform, existing global governance structures often make it difficult for any actors other than governments to have influence. For example, the World Health Assembly-the WHO's plenary governance body of 194 member states-does not formally provide a forum for these organizations to share their views and influence deliberations. This leaves relatively weak actor power focused on pandemics if both the WHO and states fail to prioritize it. 279 
B. IDEAS
The second category of determinants of global political priority is the way in which those involved with any particular issue understand and portray it. This involves both the issue's internal frame (i.e., the degree to which the policy community agrees on definitions of, causes of, and solutions to the problem) and external frame (i.e., the degree to which public portrayals of the issue resonate with external audiences). 280 Despite general agreement on the need for reforms and on broad kinds of proposals that could work, 281 there was no agreement among experts or governments on which particular IHR reforms were best, how they should be prioritized, and from where they should be financed. Competing views make it difficult to act: first, by lowering confidence in the merits of any one approach; and second, by raising the political costs associated with action given the impossibility of deferring to an "expert consensus" and the increased likelihood of vocal opposition. In addition, member states partly disagreed about the same issues among themselves.
With regard to the external framework, it has proven difficult to engage the public in the need for improving international laws and plans for future pandemics. Like with civil society mobilization, risks are unknown, remote, and distant, which makes it harder to attract public attention and concern. 282 The predominant external frame for pandemics-that "health is global" and that the health of people everywhere depends on each country's capacity to detect and quickly respond to threats emanating from their jurisdictions-has not fully resonated with the public and all decision makers.
One consequence is that pandemic preparedness has been woefully under-prioritized relative to the threats, and there has been insufficient international development assistance for preparedness in poorer countries. 283 
C. POLITICAL CONTEXTS
The environments in which global actors operate is the third category of determinants of political priority. This environment is characterized by both policy windows (i.e., political moments when global conditions align favorably for advocates to influence decision makers) and global governance structures (i.e., the degree to which norms and institutions provide a platform for effective collective action). 284 Policy windows tend to be very short when it comes to epidemics. These windows usually open near the end of the epidemic and close shortly thereafter, often before slow reform processes that involve many international institutions and states develop sufficient traction. While there is little empirical study of the exact length of policy windows, the WHO did make significant cuts to its pandemic preparedness and response budget approximately three years after each of the SARS and H1N1 pandemics, which suggests member states no longer prioritized the issue at that time. 285 The one time in the last few decades when IHR reform was achieved-in 2005-came after ten years of tough negotiations that started in 1995, combined with momentum from the SARS outbreak that ended only a year earlier. 286 Based on these experiences, policy windows for IHR reform seem to last at most three years after a major global outbreak. If states and other actors are not able to align their differing political positions and interests within this time period, IHR reform may prove impossible.
Existing global governance structures also make IHR reforms difficult. Prevailing norms for health aid do not prioritize support for public health capacities, but rather favor particular manifest diseases like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. 287 A more fundamental challenge, however, is the current international system of sovereignty, which gives near-absolute territorial control to state governments. This does not only fit poorly with the cross-border nature of global public health risks like pandemics, but it also makes significant reforms challenging because these reforms normally require that state parties relinquish some of their territorial control-which each state party will naturally hesitate to do, at least without assurance that all other parties will do the same. The WHO's lack of enforcement mechanisms makes this worse, as the organization has few tools to effectively promote State compliance. The WHO's weak position has also hampered progress more generally, as it is the one natural institution to lead IHR reform efforts. Stronger enforcement mechanisms and a stronger WHO are therefore not only the subject matter of some of the reform proposals; they are also enablers of others.
D. ISSUE CHARACTERISTICS
Finally, Shiffman and Smith's fourth category of determinants of global political priority is the features of the problem. These features include the existence of credible indicators (i.e., clear measures that show the severity of the problem and that can used to monitor progress), the problem's severity (i.e., the size of burden relative to other problems, as indicated by objective measures), and the existence of effective interventions (i.e., whether proposed means of addressing the problem are clearly explained, cost effective, backed by scientific evidence, simple to implement, and inexpensive). 288 The potential consequences of a pandemic can be expressed through fairly simple measures of lives lost and economic losses. There is also no question that these consequences can be catastrophic on a global scale, and that there is some agreement around the probability for a pandemic to occur. 289 Optimists and pessimists seem to converge on a risk for pandemic flu of about one to two percent a year. 290 However, there are no credible indicators for more precise figures. We do not know exactly when and where the next pandemic will hit and how bad it will be. 291 This makes it difficult not only to pin down the magnitude of the problem, but also to monitor progress in terms of risk reduction. Instead, we currently monitor progress in terms of public health capacities, but even so, we lack unambiguous and trustworthy indicators. 292 Pandemics are also special vis-à-vis most other problems. Before a pandemic emerges, its severity will be judged as small or even negligible when judged in terms of current consequences or short-term consequences. In 2008, for example, there were no recorded cases of H1N1, in contrast to the two million deaths from HIV/AIDS that year. 293 At the same time, recent epidemics had not been doomsday scenarios like those seen in Hollywood movies or like some scientists had warned. It is no surprise, therefore, that most decision makers have prioritized combating HIV/AIDS and other manifest diseases over preventing or preparing for H1N1 or other yet-to-come pandemics.
The knowledge gaps pertaining to future pandemics affect not only the perceived severity but also the perceived tractability of the problem. Many experts believe that preventing and preparing for pandemics offers great returns on investments. 294 The Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future proposes incremental funding of about $4.5 billion per year to implement the framework and compares this with expected economic losses from pandemics of over $60 billion per year. 295 Experts also agree on many of the general actions needed, including general IHR reforms. However, there is a lack of evidence on the costs and benefits of specific interventions and specific IHR reforms. Surprisingly little research has been conducted in this area. What we do know is that there are lots of short-term costs with mostly long-term benefits. We also know that reforms requiring international collaboration are particularly challenging, with some people even believing that enlightened and enduring collaboration is nearly impossible given how pandemics affect core national security interests. 296 To convince political leaders and other decision makers that the financial and political costs are worth incurring, better evidence is needed, and this evidence needs to be communicated in a plain manner.
VI. CONCLUSION AND STRATEGIES FOR OVERCOMING INACTION
Recognizing our history of re-learning lessons from past epidemics and the specific political barriers to prioritizing action, we can more effectively identify strategies for overcoming these barriers. 297 Indeed, each political barrier points to distinct strategies that can be used to gain traction for much-needed IHR reforms.
First, weak actor power and leadership points to the need for community building around pandemic prevention and preparedness. This effort must include rallying interested actors but also perhaps creating a new multi-stakeholder partnership focused on the hard work of mobilizing the relevant policy communities-a vital task that is too frequently overlooked, under-resourced, and insufficiently valued. The Americanled Global Health Security Agenda has made a good start in undertaking this community-building work; the initiative has brought together nearly fifty countries and many international organizations to renew their commitment to fighting global health threats posed by infectious diseases. 298 Hundreds of millions of dollars have been put on the table to facilitate this initiative, most of it coming from the U.S. Department of Defense's biological threats program and the US Congress's budget appropriations for the Ebola response. 299 As a result, many countries, including China, 300 Ethiopia, 301 Indonesia, 302 Pakistan, 303 Uganda, 304 and Vietnam, 305 have committed to boosting their core public health capacities for preventing, detecting, and responding to epidemics. A new process for external country assessments has also been developed and piloted. 306 While the Global Health Security Agenda represents important progress, it cannot substitute for the universal role served by the WHO. Weak actor power points intensely towards the importance of the WHO, its unique role, and the critical need to get its house in order. On one hand there is no replacing the WHO as the single most important guiding institution for making reforms to the way in which we prevent, prepare for, and respond to pandemics. But on the other hand, pandemics are too serious and threatening to wait additional decades for the WHO to become the effective global public health agency it needs to be. 307 In the meantime, we must build resilience into our global pandemic governance system by encouraging leadership from elsewhere. This may come from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and the coalition of countries supporting the Global Health Security Agenda. 308 It is also time that some civil society organizations see it as their role to advocate for pandemic prevention and preparedness, however unsexy the topic may be. Likewise, strong actors outside the health sector must be involved. Here, the Sustainable Development Goals ("SDGs") bring promise. Part of Goal 3 suggests "[s]trengthen[ing] the capacity of all countries, in particular developing countries, for early warning, risk reduction and management of national and global health risks." 309 As heads of government will report on their progress towards the SDGs, it is possible that pandemic preparedness will attract more attention from them and other key players outside the health sector. Advocates for pandemic preparedness should help ensure that the SDGs achieve this effect. In any event, it is vital that these actors proceed in a way that strengthens the long-term capabilities of the WHO rather than undermines it.
Second, the insufficiently consistent ways in which pandemics are understood internally by the policy community points to a need to foster more agreement on specific details. In particular, there is a need for greater consensus on which specific reforms should be prioritized and exactly how they should be implemented. Fortunately, the many post-Ebola review panels may already be starting to achieve this goal. 310 The recommendations of these panels have been overwhelmingly consistent in their main messages, albeit rather different in their guidance for actually operationalizing these messages. While many experts complained about panel fatigue, 311 these panels at least provide an opportunity for key opinion leaders to have their say and to become empowered to champion the changes they endorsed. What will be needed is greater efforts to extract the common suggestions across these postmortem exercises and to distill those suggestions into clear actions that are feasible for global decision makers to pursue. More research will also help inform the development and implementation of such concrete steps over the longer term.
Greater consensus and more evidence would also help promote attention to pandemic preparedness outside the immediate policy community. Only then will the public and a wider set of decision makers see that pandemic preparedness is an area where highly effective interventions are available and where highly attractive investments can be made. At the same time, the risk of large-scale epidemics must be vivid, without creating unnecessary fear. 312 More credible indicators of the probability, likely trajectory, and severity of epidemics can have this effect, as can a highly visible watch list of potential priority outbreaks.
Third, the political context in which decisions about global pandemic governance are made works against the likelihood of reforms being achieved. In addition to the WHO's current weaknesses, the effectiveness of the broader regime is based on goodwill, solidarity, and voluntary compliance. There are no sticks and few carrots to incentivize adherence to the IHR. This lack of enforcement mechanisms means the IHR are probably taken less seriously by the 196 states that are legally required to follow them. 313 Adding enforcement mechanisms to the IHR-for example, through mandatory dispute resolution processes-could therefore not only help ensure the treaty's edicts come into real-world effect, but could encourage state parties to take the whole regime more seriously. 314 But, such changes would need to be implemented or locked-in very quickly given the short policy windows that seem to follow each largescale epidemic, another feature of the political context that works against reform. The reality is that action is probably needed within three years of the Ebola crisis's peak passing, which, in terms of number of new cases, was October 2014. 315 This means we estimate that a new grand bargain for the IHR must be in place by the fall of 2017, or else a new bargain will not be politically possible until after another epidemic reminds us of the IHR's current weaknesses. While the Zika virus outbreak may renew or extend this timeline, each passing day without decisive action reduces the likelihood that reforms will be achieved within the current policy window.
Even if the current policy window does actually pass, leaders should continue to slog away on IHR reforms, knowing that the next epidemic will probably open a similar policy window for their work to be acted upon. These efforts will provide the foundation for future IHR reforms just like the ongoing reform process in the early 2000s laid the basis for SARS to trigger actual change. 316 In the post-Ebola window and beyond, there is also need for donors to re-examine the allocation of health aid. Alongside the looming crisis of antimicrobial resistance, 317 Ebola presses the question of whether traditional aid should be reoriented towards transnational threats. In particular, external assistance should probably be leveraged to a much greater extent than today for strengthening national public health capacities. 318 Fourth, the issue characteristics of pandemics mean there is great political priority for them during outbreaks but relatively little before and after these crises. For an issue of this kind, evidence on the problem as well as the solutions is particularly important. Increasing funding for pandemic modeling research to predict future disease transmission, health effects, and economic impact, can all help galvanize political attention. Similarly, the research community must invest in developing a science of global strategy that could offer insights into what specific IHR reforms would maximize effectiveness. 319 These streams of research should also clearly demonstrate how pandemic preparedness is a global good and how investments can benefit everyone.
Overall, we know the IHR are in desperate need of reform, and we have seen that lessons learned from the Ebola epidemic are similar to lessons learned from the H1N1 pandemic before it. This Article has laid out the political barriers to implementing needed IHR reforms and the strategies to overcome these barriers. The strategies will hopefully be deployed now to reform the IHR before the policy window following Ebola closes, and before the inevitable next epidemic strikes.
